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Consider, anatomize the eye: Survey its structure and contrivance; and tell me, 
from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does not flow in upon you with 
a force like that of sensation. 
—David Hume 1779, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part III 
Organs of extreme perfection and complication— 
To suppose that the eye, with all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the 
focus to different distances, for admitting different amounts of light, and for the 
correction of spherical and chromatic aberration, could have been formed by nat­
ural selection, seems, I freely confess, absurd in the highest possible degree. Yet 
reason tells me, that if numerous gradations from a perfect and complex eye to 
one very imperfect and simple, each grade being useful to its possessor, can be 
shown to exist; if further, the eye does vary ever so slightly, and the variations 
be inherited, which is certainly the case; and if any variation or modification in 
the organ be ever useful to an animal under changing conditions of life, then the 
difficulty of believing that a perfect and complex eye could be formed by natural 
selection, though insuperable by our imagination, can hardly be considered real. 
—Charles Darwin 1859, On the Origin of Species, Chapter VI 
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Tracing Links of Causation 
Much in the biological world appears to us purposive. Much appears 
governed by quite specific norms. We use these norms to assess the perfor­
mance of certain objects, to determine whether or not they have fulfilled 
their functional roles, whether or not they have done what, in some sense, 
they are supposed to do. It is natural to think that the eyes of mammals 
are for seeing, that the wings of birds are for flying, that incisors are for 
tearing and molars for mashing, and so on. The theoretically inclined 
thus will wonder, Are there norms of nature? If so, what are these norms? 
From whence do they arise? How do they attach to just some traits and 
not others? If there are no such norms, why are we so inclined to see 
some parts of nature—eyes, wings, teeth—as purposive and other 
parts—rocks, clouds, moons—as nonpurposive? And whence this incli­
nation? This book ventures answers to these questions. 
These questions concern a striking feature of life. Living things change 
and virtually all such changes appear purposive. The appearance of pur-
posiveness in the biological realm is as ubiquitous as it is striking. Organ­
isms develop and mature, recover from illness and injury, adjust to 
changes in environment, and engage in myriad behaviors. Organisms also 
suffer disease, decay, and death, and even these processes can appear pur­
posive. It thus is plausible, perhaps natural, to conceptualize change 
among the living as purposive. Anyone striving to understand the world 
we inhabit will be drawn to questions about these phenomena. However, 
in addition to their intrinsic interest, these questions arise from a prima 
facie tension between the methods and postulations of the natural sci­
ences generally and the attribution of natural norms. We tend to be­
lieve that physical phenomena are the results of natural laws governing 
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physical elements. We tend to think of physical theories as accounts of 
the ways things are and the way things behave, and perhaps also the ways 
things might have been. But we tend to think differently about biological 
phenomena. Our biological theories account for the way things are, to 
be sure, but they also account for the way things should be. We tend to 
think, for example, that a malfunctioning eye, despite its defective condi­
tion, nevertheless is supposed to perform its functional task. There is a 
norm of performance that applies to eyes and persists in the face of inca­
pacitation. Or so we tend to believe. The philosophical question, then, 
is, What are these norms of nature such that we appeal to them in the 
course of inquiry and such that they do not conflict with the methods 
and postulations of the natural sciences generally? 
Biologists appeal to functions in the course of theorizing about the 
biological realm and it might be thought that we should turn to them for 
an account of what functions really are. It might be thought that the 
explicit or implicit understanding of functions among biologists will an­
swer the above question. I have doubts about that. The task is to show 
how the notion of functions in biology fits within the larger framework 
of the natural sciences generally. It seems naive to think that biologists, 
in their appeals to functions, are concerned to solve this problem. It is 
one thing to appeal to functions in the course of theorizing; it is quite 
another to theorize about such appeals and the extent to which they co­
here with other areas of inquiry. Of course, theoretically inclined biolo­
gists may explain how functions fit the methods and postulations of the 
natural sciences generally, but there is nothing about being a biologist 
that provides especial qualifications for this sort of job. Nor is there good 
reason to think that biologists, as opposed to nonbiologists, have purged 
from their understanding of functions all the metaphysical—including 
the theological—strains that infect the history of this notion. One can, 
after ail, be a superb biologist and a committed theist or deist, as several 
of Darwin's peers demonstrated.1 Surely one can be a fine biologist and 
nevertheless employ a notion of functions that does not fit comfortably 
the postulations or methods of the natural sciences generally. So the job, 
1. Among the theists were Sedgwick and Whewell; among the deists were Her-
schel and Lyell. See Ruse (1979), chapter 3 and Gillespie (1979), chapter 5. See 
also chapter 5, section III below. 
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as I see it, is not to explicate or describe the way that we or certain special­
ists employ the concept of functions. T he job, rather, is constructive and, 
if need be, revisionary. I he job is to suggest how an apparently powerful 
concept is best understood within a broad domain of inquiry.2 
Contemporary theories of the norms of nature fall into three general 
categories, each of which I describe fully in chapter 2. (1) The historical 
approach asserts that functions are the product of some type of historical 
process. The most prominent version of the historical approach asserts 
that the functions of any trait emerge out of the selective success of ances­
tral tokens of that trait. Hearts have the function of pumping blood be­
cause pumping blood is the effect of ancestral hearts that contributed to 
selective success and thus caused the persistence of hearts. Advocates of 
this approach tend to assume that some natural traits are genuinely func­
tional while others are merely useful; they assume that the effects of some 
traits are 'proper" to those traits, while the effects of others are inciden­
tal. The main aim of the historical approach is to account for the alleged 
"properness" of functions in terms of some sort of historical success. 
(2) The most prominent alternative to the historical approach is the sys­
temic capacity approach. On this view, functions are attributed relative 
to the larger system within which the trait operates and relative to certain 
capacities of the larger system. The functions of any trait are those effects 
that, within the context of the system, contribute to the exercise of some 
higher-level capacity. Hearts have the function of pumping blood, relative 
to the capacity of the circulatory system to distribute nutrients through­
out the body, because pumping blood contributes to the exercise of this 
higher-level capacity. Critics of this approach charge that it is incapable 
2. In this respect, my approach differs from that of most contemporary theorists. 
From l5randon (1981, 1990), through Neander (1991) and Griffiths (1993), and 
up to Walsh (1996), Preston (1998), and Buller (1998), the approach to functions 
is generally conservative. The approach is to conserve what appear to be central 
intuitions concerning the nature of functions—intuitions of biologists and other 
specialists, mainly. The view defended here, by contrast, advocates the revision 
of at least one feature of functions thought to be conceptually central—the alleged 
normativity of functions that underwrites the attribution of malfunctions. On 
my view, the functions of natural, nonengineered traits are not (and cannot be) 
normative in the way most theorists suggest, and I offer an alternative approach 
to understanding malfunctions. 
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of distinguishing between effects of traits that are "proper" and those 
that are incidentally useful. In consequence, it is generally believed that, 
even if the systemic approach is compelling in its own right, an additional 
theory of functions is required to account for genuinely teleological ef­
fects. And that brings us to (3) the combination approach, consisting of 
various attempts to combine the historical and systemic capacity ap­
proaches into one theory. Advocates of this approach tend to assume that 
historical functions—unlike systemic functions—account for effects that 
are genuinely teleological. Motivation for the combination approach de­
rives from this assumption, combined with the claim that systemic func­
tions nevertheless serve important theoretical aims. One version of the 
combination approach claims that there is a single, unified theory that 
subsumes both views under the concept "design." Another holds that 
both views of functions are required but must be kept separate on the 
grounds that each applies to distinct phenomena. And additional options 
have been suggested. 
My aim is to develop and defend a distinct version of the second ap­
proach. In its original formulation (Cummins 1975), the theory of sys­
temic capacity functions asserts that functions are causal or structural 
capacities that contribute to the exercise of some larger systemic capacity 
within a complex system. I accept this basic view. In addition, I defend 
four substantive theses, each of which extends or revises the original the­
ory. The first asserts that the systemic approach is more general in scope 
and, in fact, subsumes the historical approach. The systemic approach 
attributes functions to the components of populations and organisms af­
fected by selection, as well as systems not affected by selection. This ap­
proach thus warrants all the functions attributed from within the 
historical approach, and numerous others as well. The historical ap­
proach, in consequence, taken as a separate autonomous theory, is redun­
dant and ought to be discarded. I defend this claim in chapter 3. The 
second thesis is that the systemic approach ought to be restricted to sys­
tems that are hierarchically organized. This restriction blocks the oft-
repeated criticism that the systemic approach is promiscuous in the 
functions it ascribes. I defend this claim in chapter 4. The third thesis 
concerns the intuition we have that certain features of some traits are 
genuinely functional, while others are useful but not "properly" func-
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tional. It also concerns the related intuition that certain traits, when dam­
aged or diseased, are properly classified as malfunctional, while other 
traits, upon losing their utility, lose their functional status. My thesis is 
that, while both intuitions are in error, we nevertheless can explain the 
source of these intuitions. My Humean suggestion appeals to the effects 
of highly regular or highly complex hierarchical systems on our psychol­
ogy. I speculate that such systems, insofar as they are self-preserving or 
self-perpetuating, cause us to expect their components to continue on in 
the same way, thereby generating the intuition that only some things are 
functional and that only some things qualify as malfunctional. I defend 
this revisionist claim in chapters 5, 6, and 7. The fourth thesis is that the 
systemic approach has superior naturalistic credentials. In particular, the 
attribution of systemic capacity functions is open to empirical and theo­
retical tests and, moreover, the theory as a whole is confirmed by the 
detailed case studies offered, for example, by Eng (1979) and by Bechtel 
and Richardson (1993). I defend this claim in chapter 6. 
Virtues of the systemic capacity approach are highlighted by the defects 
of the historical approach. The first defect, noted above, is that the histor­
ical approach is redundant on the systemic capacity approach and hence 
ought to be discarded. The second is that the historical approach, in at­
tempting to account for the possibility of malfunctions, commits itself to 
the existence of quite specific norms of performance that are noncausal 
and nonphysical in nature. I defend this construal in chapter 5. I then 
argue that we have powerful naturalistic reasons, external to the theory 
of selected functions, to reject the postuiation of such norms. Third, and 
contrary to the claims of its advocates, the historical approach also lacks 
the internal resources with which to account for the possibility of mal­
functions. I defend this claim in chapter 7. Accounting for malfunctions 
is said to be among the central virtues of the historical approach. So if 
the arguments of chapters 5 and 7 are sound, we ought to conclude that 
the historical approach, by its own lights, is a failed theory. Moreover, 
insofar as the combination approach inherits the central substantive the­
ses of the historical approach, the defects of the latter infect the former. 
Cast generally, then, I advocate the view that functions are nothing 
more than systemic capacities that contribute to the exercise of higher-
level capacities we wish to understand and control. Functions, on this 
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view, are effects that play a role in the workings of hierarchical systems. 
This is to emphasize the mundane but central fact that functional proper­
ties concern the operations or workings of those parts of nature that are 
systemic in a rather minimal sense of the term. The relevant sorts of sys­
tems are numerous and diverse. We may analyze the capacity of salt mole­
cules to dissolve in water in terms of the systemic functions of constituent 
molecules. Or we may analyze the capacity of the circulatory system to 
distribute nutrients in terms of the systemic functions of its components. 
Significantly, we can also conceptualize entire populations of organisms 
as systems that accomplish various kinds of work. Populations evolve in 
certain ways; populations also remain in equilibrium in certain ways. We 
thus may analyze the capacity of a population in terms of the systemic 
functions of its structural components. Conceptualizing functions in this 
way—in terms of systemic work—enables the theory to attribute sys­
temic functions to components of even the simplest systems, as well as 
systems of great complexity. This, as I argue in chapter 3, is an important 
result, as it dissolves the need for two separate theories of functions— 
selected and systemic—and enables us to formulate a single, comprehen­
sive version of the theory of systemic functions. 
My answer, then, to the question, Are there norms of nature? is the 
following: There are components of natural systems endowed with capac­
ities of great importance to the workings of the system. The aim of scien­
tific inquiry quite generally is to discover, understand, and control those 
systemic capacities. But the components of natural, nonengineered sys­
tems, contrary to the claims of the historical approach and contrary to 
most versions of the combination approach, possess no norms of perfor­
mance. They possess systemic capacities the effects of which enable the 
larger system to work in ways we wish to understand. But they do not 
possess the sorts of properties attributed from within the historical ap­
proach to functions. Several of the arguments developed throughout this 
book are intended to establish this negative view. The truth of this view, 
however, leaves ample room for an array of other sorts of norms, many 
of which are aptly characterized as natural. These are norms that emerge 
in the course of various human activities. There are, for example, episte-
mic norms generated by our informed expectations of certain categories 
of traits classified in terms of systemic capacities. These are important, I 
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believe, in understanding why we are so inclined to classify incapacitated 
token traits as malfunctional. I return to this topic in chapters 6 and 7. 
My view of the norms of nature also leaves room for norms that emerge 
in the course of personal, social, legal, commercial, and ethical relation­
ships.3 And my answer to the question, Why are we inclined to see some 
things as functional and others as nonfunctional? is that certain sorts of 
systems cause us to expect effects that, relative to the systemic capacity 
we wish to understand, play especially salient systemic roles. This will 
become clearer in the course of my discussion of epistemic norms and 
the attribution of malfunctions. 
Whatever the full range of natural norms involved in various human 
activities, my concern here is first and foremost with the sorts of norms 
thought to apply to nonengineered natural traits at all levels of biological 
organization, from the molecular to the behavioral. My concern is with 
the norms said to apply to genes and neurotransmitters, to hearts, eyes, 
and teeth, to foraging strategies and mating displays. These traits, it is 
claimed, are purposive or functional quite apart from our epistemic or 
practical concerns; these traits possess norms of performance quite apart 
from our attempts to understand or control them. The claim is that these 
norms have arisen from historical-causal-mechanical processes, and noth­
ing else. And it is this claim I shall be concerned to assess, for I believe 
it to be mistaken. 
The focus of my discussion thus excludes the functional status of arti­
facts. The functions of artifacts involve the intentions of designers and 
manufacturers and the social, legal, and ethical relations between manu­
facturers and consumers. An adequate account of artifact functions must 
explain how the relevant intentions and conventions help produce and 
sustain such functions. But these factors do not apply to the functional 
standing of nonengineered natural traits. It is naive to think that the func­
tions of nonengineered natural traits—the workings of which are causal-
historical and independent of our intentions or conventions—suffice as 
a model for understanding the functions of artifacts. It is equally naive 
to think that the functions of artifacts—the workings of which depend 
3. I have in mind the views of Blackburn (1998), Gibbard (1990), and Harris 
(1999). 
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upon our intentions and conventions—provide an adequate model for 
understanding the functions of natural traits. The theory of systemic func­
tions, as developed here, is intended to apply foremost to nonengineered 
natural traits. In consequence, I shall appeal to the functions of artifacts 
sparingly and with caution. Extending the theory of systemic functions 
to the relevant sorts of intentional and conventional factors involved in 
the functions of artifacts is a project for some other occasion. 
The view I defend is also revisionist in nature. It aims to dispense with 
the notion that natural traits are "properly" functional or "for the sake" 
of some end. Function attributions are important in inquiry, as I intend 
to show, but their importance in no way requires us to believe in functions 
that are "proper" or otherwise distinct from other sorts of systemic ca­
pacities. Such revisionism might give the impression that I endorse what 
Enc and Adams (1992) call the "eliminativist view" of functions, ac­
cording to which there is no difference between dispositional properties 
generally and functional properties specifically: 
[Eliminativist] views identify functions merely with the activities (or dispositions) 
of a character that happen to interest the investigator, and they effectively reject 
the intuition that a real difference exists between dispositions and functions. (Enc 
and Adams 1992, 637) 
En$ and Adams reject the eliminativist option, claiming that it conflicts 
with common sense. This is to assume that a condition of adequacy on 
any theory of functions is that it distinguish functions from dispositions 
generally. This seems a plausible assumption—though I think we should 
be prepared to discover that no such distinction can be sustained and 
that eliminativism is the correct view. Nevertheless, my view does not 
belong in the eliminativist camp; my view is revisionist without being 
eliminativist. The theory of systemic functions dispenses with the postula-
tion of properties intended to explicate our sense that some effects are 
"proper" or "for the sake" of some end. Hence the revision. But the 
theory asserts that functions are specific capacities within certain kinds 
of systems relative to certain systemic capacities of the larger system. Not 
just any kind of disposition qualifies as a systemic function. As I argue 
in chapter 4, systemic functions arise only in the context of hierarchical 
systems and only when they contribute to a real capacity of the larger 
system. Our explanatory interests may be important in the discovery of 
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systemic functions, but our interests are neither necessary nor sufficient 
for the existence of such functions. And that makes my version of the 
theory revisionist without being eliminativist. 
Portraying and defending the above view is the task of the chapters that 
follow, but the general picture can be sketched in broad strokes from the 
thoughts of Aristotle, Hume, and Darwin, all of whom puzzled at length 
over the apparent purposiveness of nature. Consider Aristotle's introduc­
tory remarks to Parts of Animals. Studying animals, he says, no matter 
how grotesque, gives us amazing pleasure: 
Having already treated of the celestial world, as far as our conjectures could 
reach, we proceed to treat of animals, without omitting, to the best of our ability, 
any member of the kingdom, however ignoble. For if some have no graces to 
charm the senses, yet nature, which fashioned them, gives amazing pleasure in 
their study to all who can trace links of causation, and are inclined to philosophy. 
(Parts of Animals, 645a, 5-10) 
The pleasure comes from tracing links of causation that operate within 
animals. But not just any links will do. Animals, according to Aristotle, 
are "fashioned" by nature. We experience pleasure by tracing links that 
reveal the way in which an animal's parts are "put together," by uncov­
ering links the efficacy of which fulfills the proper "ends" of the animal. 
In doing so, we encounter a form of the beautiful: 
Absence of haphazard and conduciveness of everything to an end are to be found 
in nature's works in the highest degree, and the end for which those works are 
put together and produced is a form of the beautiful. (645a, 23-25) 
Now, the parts of animals can elicit an aesthetic response. Evidence 
for this is compelling. Many capacities of organisms involve complex in­
teractions of several parts and layers of functional dependence, and un­
derstanding and appreciating the exercise of such capacities—respiration, 
circulation, digestion, locomotion, thought, speech, and more—affects 
us aesthetically. Indeed, I read Cleanthes's remarks in the opening epi­
graph as expressing one such aesthetic reaction (more on this shortly). 
Moreover, animal parts tend to serve animal needs, as traits that fail to 
contribute to an organism's survival or reproduction tend to atrophy or 
disappear thanks to selection and regressive evolution. It is not the case, 
however, that animals or natural systems generally are "put together" or 
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"produced." On a more contemporary view, organisms evolve and give 
rise to further forms of life, but no one and no thing fashions the forms 
that emerge. They emerge thanks to the effects of evolutionary forces— 
including selection, drift, and migration—that preserve or eliminate 
forms that arise by mutation and recombination. Of course, selection has 
the effect of sorting the efficacious from the nonefficacious or the less 
efficacious and, as Ayala (1970) points out, this type of sorting, repeated 
over stretches of evolutionary time, can give rise to complex, adapted 
systems that otherwise would not have evolved. But selection, like other 
evolutionary processes, depends upon factors that are blind, nondirec-
tional, and, to use Aristotle's term, haphazard: Selection depends upon 
the range of actual mutations, the extent of migration, and the contingen­
cies of the selective regimes. And although selection may have the effect 
of sorting from among such materials, that hardly amounts to the "craft­
ing" or "putting together" of such systems. The pleasure we enjoy in 
tracing causal links, then, contrary to Aristotle, cannot come from dis­
covering the ends for which an animal is put together, for the realm of 
nonengineered natural traits is devoid of such ends.4 
Since the ends to which Aristotle appeals are illusory, so too are the 
Aristotelean functions ascribed to the parts of animals. I accept, however, 
Aristotle's claim that tracing the operations of hierarchical systems such 
as animals is both important and attractive. In tracing links of causation 
that give rise to more-general systemic operations, we discover the sys­
temic functions of natural objects. This, as we shall see, is important in 
various theoretical endeavors. Moreover, there is pleasure in tracing these 
links. We discover forms that seize our attention, that fascinate and de-
4. Ayala runs together language describing the production of artifacts and lan­
guage describing the causal-mechanical processes that give rise to nonengineered 
natural traits: "The hand of man is made for grasping, and his eye for vision. 
Tools and certain types of machines made by man are teleological in this sense" 
(Ayala 1970, 9). Tools and machines are for certain ends, to be sure, but it is 
doubtful that the same is true of hands and eyes. We certainly should not take 
this as a datum, as part of the natural phenomena; rather, it should be treated 
as a conclusion in need of argument. As I point out above, the intentional and 
conventional features of artifactual functions do not apply to natural functions. 
Hands and eyes have an evolutionary history, of course, but they were not made 
for the performance of some specific task. 
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light us, that perplex and disgust us, that fill us with awe. We are natural 
systems that, thanks to our cognitive, volitional, and sensory systems, are 
capable of being moved in these ways by the natural systems with which 
we interact. It would be a great puzzle if things were otherwise. It would 
be puzzling if the living things with which we interact failed to command 
our attention and provoke discernible aesthetic reactions in us. It would 
be puzzling if we did not inherit from our ancestors the propensity to be 
gripped by living things all around us. We would be left to wonder how 
our species has managed to survive. 
My reaction to the historical approach to functions parallels my reac­
tion to Aristotle. Advocates of the historical approach posit functional 
roles with associated norms of performance. These roles are said to persist 
even when the requisite physical capacities are lost. But we should reject 
these norms as surely as we reject Aristotelean ends; this, at any rate, is 
the thesis of chapters 5 and 7. At the same time, and as I suggest in chapter 
3, we can understand and preserve the nonnormative elements of the his­
torical approach from within the systemic capacity approach. On my 
view, the functions that emerge as a consequence of ancestral selective 
success are nothing more than one kind of systemic capacity function. 
This kind of systemic function emerges in the context of an analysis of 
the population and the population's components, including an analysis 
of the varying organisms and their varying capacities. We thus can trace 
theoretically important links of causation within a population and iden­
tify salient systemic capacities. And we can do so without positing the 
existence of norms that persist in the absence of requisite physical 
mechanisms. 
The opening epigraph from Hume is a key passage from Cleanthes's 
"irregular" argument for the existence of the Judeo-Christian God. The 
argument asserts an analogy between the natural and the artifactual 
realms, but makes the further claim that our knowledge of or access to 
this analogy is noncognitive. The claim, at minimum, is that our grasp 
of the similarity between the natural and the artifactual is not exclusively 
cognitive—the idea of a contriver hits us like a sensation. If we look 
without prejudice upon the complex adaptations of the world—the eye, 
for example—we simply see that such objects are the products of an intel­
ligent contriver. We do not infer it; we see it. Or, at the very least, what 
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we see causes us to feel that such objects must be the result of intelligent 
design; if we do not literally see it, we at least feel it. This claim has an 
obvious Humean flavor, appealing to a sentiment that appears pervasive 
and entrenched. This claim is also surprisingly modern in flavor. It is 
similar in spirit to the intuitions, described by most contemporary theo­
rists of functions, concerning the normative status of functional proper­
ties. Cleanthes thinks that marks of intelligence are there on the surface. 
Similarly, contemporary theorists take it for granted that there are marks 
of design in the natural realm and that nature is designed even though 
there is no designer. 
At any rate, it is striking that Philo, Hume's skeptic, does not endeavor 
to refute this version of the argument from design. This is striking given 
Hume's general propensity to explain away recalcitrant phenomena— 
miracles, freedom of will, causal necessity—in psychological or sociologi­
cal terms. An appeal to our psychological capacities would be especially 
attractive after Part VIII of the Dialogues, where Philo develops the Epi­
curean chance hypothesis concerning the origins of natural order. The 
chance hypothesis provides a how-possibly explanation for the emer­
gence of order that in no way appeals to an intelligent designer. Having 
shown that order could arise from purely causal-mechanical processes, 
it is plausible to suggest that our inclination to see the world in terms of 
design is explicable in light of certain facts about our psychology, rather 
than facts about the nonpsychological world. 
The theory of systemic capacity functions, as developed below, adopts 
this Humean strategy in limited fashion. I appeal to various psychological 
speculations to display the relative strength of the systemic functions ap­
proach and also to explain away some of the presumed phenomena that 
motivate the historical approach. As we have seen, some advocates of 
the historical approach contend that some natural things—eyes, wings, 
teeth—possess genuine norms of performance, while other things— 
rocks, clouds, moons—may function as this or that but possess no such 
norms. Some things are purposive, others merely useful. Advocates of the 
historical approach assert that they can account for this difference while 
the theory of systemic functions cannot. But this is not so. As I argue in 
chapters 5 and 7, there are good reasons for rejecting the claim that natu­
ral objects such as eyes or teeth possess the sorts of norms attributed from 
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within the historical approach. Moreover, and as I argue in chapters 4 
and 6, the theory of systemic functions can account for the fact that we 
are inclined to see some things as more functional than others. The theory 
accounts for this inclination in good Humean fashion, without counte­
nancing the roles and norms of performance posited within the historical 
approach. 
Finally, the second epigraph with which this book opens comes from 
a well-known section of the Origin in which Darwin admits that complex 
adaptations like the eye pose a powerful prima facie challenge to his the­
ory. But he also insists that, if guided by reason, we can construct a plausi­
ble how-possibly explanation of the evolution of such adaptations, no 
matter how complex they may be. Like Hume's Philo, Darwin is con­
cerned to establish the possibility that order and adaptations arise from 
purely causal-mechanical processes. But unlike Philo (and Hume), Dar­
win offers a specific kind of causal mechanism and an abundance of 
evidence for the existence and efficacy of that mechanism; Darwin's 
how-possibly explanation, once filled out, shades into a powerful how-
actually explanation.5 In defending the claim that the order and com­
plexity of adaptations like the eye could have arisen as a gradual and 
cumulative effect of natural selection, Darwin is resisting the creationist 
tendencies of his peers. As Hull (1973) demonstrates, Darwin's critics— 
including his most accomplished peers—could not accept the suggestion 
that natural selection is potent enough to explain the emergence of traits 
as functional as the eye. Selection alone, they claimed, could not explain 
the emergence of such highly adapted complexity; some form of intelli­
gence was required, if only to guide the evolutionary process from afar. 
And as Gillespie (1979) shows, the doctrine of creation was embraced in 
various forms. Some theorists (for example, Agassiz) insisted that new 
species had to be the effects of special acts of creation; others (Richard 
Owen) insisted that the emergence of new species had to be ordained by 
a predetermining will; still others (Asa Gray, Charles Lyell, and Alfred 
5. Brandon (1990) appeals to the notion of a how-possibly explanation in order 
to characterize the empirical constraints on adequate selective explanations. The 
considerations offered address the worry, pressed by Gould and Lewontin (1979), 
that adaptationist explanations all too often are illegitimately unconstrained. See 
Brandon (1990), chapter 5. 
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Wallace) insisted that the variation necessary for selection had to be the 
work of an intelligent, designing deity. These critics agreed that God's 
designing intentions enter the historical process at some time or other. 
They agreed that our explanations had to appeal to God's intentions be­
cause the design of the natural world was simply too complex and too 
vast—marked by too much intelligence—for natural selection. 
Advocates of the historical approach to functions, of course, do not 
embrace theism or deism—not, at any rate, in their philosophical works. 
Unlike Darwin's critics, they insist that selection can account for natural 
design. Nor do they claim that nature is literally designed, only that it has 
a kind of design, one that arises out of the process of selection: ". . . one 
of Darwin's important discoveries is that we can think of design without 
a designer" (Kitcher 1993, 380).6 But it is here, in the postulation of 
natural design, that I demur. Advocates of the historical approach and 
of the combination approach assert that the biological realm is designed 
in some respect or other and that we can understand this design in terms 
of natural selection. On my view, it is a mistake to hold that nature is 
designed in any sense of the term. There is order, regularity, degrees of 
complexity, and degrees of adaptedness—but no design. Of course, we 
analyze natural systems into systemic capacities in order to understand 
and control their operations, and it is tempting to conceive of these sys­
tems in terms of some sort of design. But we are wrong to give in to such 
temptation. Natural systems are comprised of parts that interact with one 
another, and sometimes these interactions are astonishingly complex and 
elegant. But that shows only that natural systems work—they exercise 
higher-level capacities by virtue of organized lower-level capacities— 
without having been designed and without exemplifying marks of design. 
Darwin did not show us how to understand the world in terms of design 
despite the absence of a designer; he showed us instead that we ought to 
stop thinking of the world in terms of design. He showed us that the 
biological realm exhibits great regularity and complexity as a result of 
nothing more than causal and mechanical historical processes. 
6. This type of claim is surprisingly common in the literature on functions, from 
Ayala (1970) to Allen and Bekoff (1995). And other philosophers appeal to this 
claim in theorizing about various phenomena. Dretske (1995), for example, en­
dorses Kitcher's assertion in the course of developing a theory of consciousness. 
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My aim is to show how to understand the attribution of functions in 
biology and elsewhere in a way that coheres with the methods and postu-
lations of the natural sciences generally. And my strategy is to develop a 
theory of functions compatible with the fact that the nonengineered, nat­
ural realm is devoid of design. To accomplish this, we must revise—not 
simply explicate—the concepts involved, especially our concepts of func­
tion and design. We must relinquish the associations we have between 
these notions and the norms of performance posited by the historical ap­
proach. Our naturalistic scruples demand this. On the view offered here, 
the living realm is populated with complex, adapted systems that work, 
that accomplish a seemingly endless array of tasks. All these systems are 
products of evolutionary processes. But none of these facts underwrites 
anything more than the attribution of systemic capacity functions. The 
urge to attribute norms that violate our naturalistic commitments is, I 
believe, best explained by considering the nature of the urge. We can trace 
the causal and structural links between the parts of plants and animals 
and thereby formulate predictions and explanations, but to think we can 
do more is to regress to a brand of metaphysics untethered from the world 
we strive to understand. 
